War: Plague of the Human Psyche

A key component of any history is the motives for actions taken therein. As in modern times, the proper motives must be established in any rallying speech calling for action or on any bill appending the law before either can be seriously considered, so in studying ancient times people want not only to know what happened, but also why it happened. Thucydides amply satisfies this curiosity in the descriptions of motives in his History, going as far as to show why men truly act as opposed to why they say they act. He juxtaposes the true motives of actions taken in the Peloponnesian War with the specious motives given by those acting in order to portray the disease of war as something which makes men usurp honesty and virtue with whatever qualities best catalyze the increase of their own power.

During the Plataean affair, that is, the Plataean surrender to Sparta, the Spartans hear what Thebes and Plataea have to say regarding how Plataea ought to be treated after the war (Thucydides History 3.52–68). Plataea speaks first and reminds the Spartans of past help that Platea offered to their city against both the Persians and Messenian Helots (Thucydides History 3.54). Plataeans, they say, cared for the graves of the Spartans who fell beside them while fighting the Persians, while the Thebans fought on the side of the Persians (Thucydides History 3.58). They also argue that since Sparta sent Platea to ally with Athens, Sparta must now except the Platean-Athenian alliance and not attempt to punish Platea for it (Thucydides History 3.55). Finally, the Plataeans conclude that they surrendered their city to Sparta, and not to the Thebans who were now encouraging their demise, reminding Sparta to decide for herself what is best (Thucydides History 3.59). Sparta, however, sides with the Thebans, who deem the Plataeans unworthy of pity, saying that they willfully atticized and broke their own treaty by killing their prisoners (Thucydides History 3.65–66). Accordingly, the Spartans slay the Plataeans and raze their city, building an inn on their land and letting it out on a ten-year lease to Theban occupiers (Thucydides History 3.68.3). The Spartans of course claim that the reason for their acting as they did is that it is the most “fair” judgement (Thucydides History 3.68.1). Thucydides disagrees with the Spartans, however, and says that the true reasoning for their adopting such an adverse attitude in the Plataean affair was “to please the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in the war at that moment raging” (Thucydides History 3.68).

If somehow the capture of Plataea were to have been the final act of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans would no longer have needed war allies, and would likely have considered the Plataean’s claims with equanimity. The ongoing war, however, causing the judgements of even the finest men to be skewed, religious practice to fall to the wayside, and personal gain to be sought above all other enterprises, made the Spartans side with Thebes.

The events leading to the Athenian expedition to Sicily are ridden with examples of self proclaimed motives being far from the truthful ones. Thucydides notes that the entire Athenian populace was “ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole, although they had the specious design of aiding their kindred and other allies in the land” (Thucydides History 6.6). It is well to note that the false reason for the Athenian voyage is one of ostensibly valorous aspiration. The Egestans, Athenian allies, having “gone to war with their neighbors the Selinuntines over questions of marriage and disputed territory,” invoke Athenian aid more than ever before as the Selinuntines ally themselves with the Syracusans and now “press Egesta hard by land and sea” (Thucydides History 6.6.2). The Athenians, then, make themselves out to be heroic and selfless, when in reality they prove to act only for selfish ambition, which demonstrates that they, concealing the truth about their motives, know that they are acting unjustly. This fact is important to note as it demonstrates that the Athenians are not deceived, but willfully choose to act in an unvirtuous manner. 

What is perhaps worse than the Athenian’s use of their allies as an excuse to catalyze their own growth is that the Athenians, knowing nothing about the size and number of inhabitants of Sicily, had already decided to invade Sicily when the Egestans sent for aid (Thucydides History 6.1). Outside of the context of war, however, neither the specious pretext nor the true reason for the Athenian expedition could exist. On the one hand, the Egestans would never have been invaded by the Selinuntines, and on the other, the Athenians would never have invaded Sicily. Thus, Thucydides demonstrates again that war makes men act in ways not according to virtue, but according to  whatever is most conducive to their attaining what they desire.

Alcibiades also has a specious pretext for his voyage to war, though he, unlike the majority of Athens, says openly that extending further the Athenian empire is a worthy goal in the voyage to help Egesta (Thucydides History 6.18.1). He says that if Athens refrains from further conquest, it will risk atrophy and “be in danger of being ruled” itself (Thucydides History 6.18.3). Thucydides reveals Alcibiades’ true motives, however, saying that he, “the warmest advocate of the expedition,” wants to “thwart Nicias as both his political opponent and also because of the attack he [makes] upon him in his speech;” besides this, Alcibiades is “exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hope[s] to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes” (Thucydides History 6.15.2). Alcibiades’ drive for personal  and political gain causes him to make sweeping false claims about the ease of the war. He argues that the Sicilians will be easily divided, which is contrary to the later Athenian conquest of Syracuse (Thucydides History 6.17.2). He says that the people in Sicily are “without any feeling of patriotism” and will thus aid the Athenians in their conquest of Syracuse and will either happily or indifferently be subject to Athenian rule, which statement is disproven by the fact that the Athenian attempt to gain allies sees little success, whereas the Spartan attempt at the same conquest is exceedingly fruitful (Thucydides History 6.17.3). Finally, he claims that the Spartan fleet, whose entire navy will be inferior to the portion of the Athenian navy to be left at Athens during their Sicilian expedition, will be ineffectual against the Athenian expedition, which claim is later invalidated by the fact that the Spartan navy proves a grand hinderance to the Athenians, and ultimately contributes the the demise of Athen’s attempt on Sicily. Thucydides demonstrates through the story of Alcibiades that the disease of war corrupts not only virtue, but also foresight, rationality, and any other virtue which keeps men from attaining what they desire.

Alcibiades’ trial is also riddled with examples of war’s causing men to want to hide their true motives. The false allegations against Alcibiades, for instance, are made under the guise of just action, namely to convict a criminal and to champion Athenian democracy, but are made in reality for an attempt at administrative gain. Thucydides notes that the Athenians wrongfully accuse Alcibiades in order to attain to “the undisturbed leadership of The People” (Thucydides History 6.28.2). The true reason for Athenian power-grabbing and accusation of Alcibiades would not have been nearly so coveted outside of the context of the war, as the Athenians wanted chiefly to influence wartime decision making as best suited their own interests (Thucydides History 6.29).

Alcibiades gives sound reasons for which his trial ought not be delayed, not the least of which being that a man charged with scheming to overthrow the democracy of Athens ought not to lead Athens into war (Thucydides History 6.29.2). The Athenians, however, use the the war as an excuse to give an unfair trial. They put forth “orators who [say] that he ought at present to sail and not delay the departure of the army,” which reason for delaying the trial sounds reasonable  (Thucydides History 6.29). It would be an error of measurement, after all, to think that the trial of one man outweighs in measure of importance the restoration and help of thousands of others. The veil of rationality and virtue that the Athenians place over their plans, however, is swiftly removed by Thucydides, who says that their true reason for the postponement is “to have [Alcibiades] sent for and brought home for trial upon some graver charge, which they would the more easily trump up in his absence” (Thucydides 6.29.3). While it might be argued that the Athenians would have acted unjustly in or out of the context war, it is clear that the war is, in this case, the vehicle of their injustice, allowing them to load the jury and make a bias charge. Again, war causes men to act without consulting their faculty of reason reason.

Of the plague, Thucydides writes that men, obsessed by death, seek pleasure with no consideration of honor, law, or the gods (Thucydides History 2.53). Juxtaposing this description with that of the Peloponnesian War, he shows that war, like the plague, causes men, obsessed with their own passions and lust for power, to seek their own benefit with no regard to anything which exalts itself against their gain. War afflicts first the mind and then the body, as men preparing to go to battle and to lead others into battle are driven about by their concern for their efforts and their lives, only later to reach the beaches and plains and hills of their corporeal demise. The plague, on the contrary, afflicts first the body and later the mind, showing itself in a myriad of terrible physical symptoms before causing its host to fall into a state of despair (Thucydides History 2.51.4). Both the plague and war, however, share a common theme: “no remedy [is] found” (Thucydides History 2.51.2). Nothing better demonstrates the veracity of a claim than repeated trials, and Thucydides cogently demonstrates in his history through multiple examples that as long as the nature of mankind remains the same, “lust for power arising from greed and ambition” will continue to motivate men to do whatever best suits their present enterprise, be it creating specious pretexts or otherwise (Thucydides History 2.82.8).