Modern Art: The End of Art?

Modern art has both scandalized and intrigued its patrons for over a century. A symbol of free expression, it has enabled artists to paint, compose, and build not only through new forms, but also through new content. In light of this novel and seemingly boundless addendum to the fine arts, one is given to wonder whether the addition marks art’s culmination or its destruction, its end (goal) or its end (death). In light of classic works of aesthetic philosophy and of several deductions from logical analysis, a middle position will be adopted, wherein modern art neither culminates nor destroys art in a technical sense, but it bastardizes art by claiming that art and beauty derive from an illegitimate source: unbounded preference. Three sections comprise this essay: (1) an explication of the problem of understanding art drawing on Gadamer, (2) a loose definition of art using Gadamer, Kant, and Hegel, and (3) an argument that modern art cannot destroy or culminate, but can and does bastardize art.

Hans-Georg Gadamer illumines the present question when he explains the difficulty of understanding the beautiful as one of discovering the universal within the particular. This quest to attain “sensuous knowledge” proves paradoxical, for “we can only speak of knowledge proper when we have ceased to be determined by the subjective and the sensible and have come to grasp the universal, the regularity in things.” Put differently, when pondering beautiful things, one must seek not subjective experience, but universal reality if he wants to grasp “the beautiful” as such. Gadamer’s paradox of sensuous knowledge raises our discussion’s central question: how can subjective experience have discernable, universal qualities? Modern artists’ argument for their art’s acceptance relies on the claim that the beautiful is ultimately a product of subjective, individual choice that relies not on the art’s substance, but on the viewer’s interpretation. Thus, anything can become “art” by its mere display as artwork: paint 1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays,” tr. Nicholas Walker, ed. Robert Bernasconi; Cambridge University Press (1986) 16. Subsequent quotations from Gadamer are derived from this work. splotches, snow shovels, unchiseled rocks, etc. 2 Gadamer ironically delineates this misguided criterion of “art”: “The identity of the work [of art] is not guaranteed by any classical or formalist criteria, but is secured by the way in which we take the construction of the work upon ourselves as a task” (28). If this criterion is accurate, then only the individual can distinguish art from non-art, and he can do this for himself alone. Gadamer thus brings us to the central dilemma: subjective critical standards for art seem to imply an infinite and unbounded range of possible “artwork.” If interpretation alone secures art’s identity, then anything might reasonably be deemed art by its mere display as art. This quality indeed appears the only distinguishing feature of such pieces as Marcel Duchamp’s snow shovel, now on display at New York’s Museum of Modern Art (MOMA); were it not for its location, the shovel might easily be mistaken for any other shovel. It would surely function as any snow shovel were it to be used as one, and it might well have been a help this winter. The museum ostensibly displays only the shovel’s form, abstracting its function, but this effort proves vain. Only guards and locks prevent the shovel’s removal and use as a shovel, so the function as such is not abstracted, but precluded. None familiar with shovels as tools can abstract this shovel into mere form, as MOMA suggests when describing the exhibit: “To make In Advance of the Broken Arm, Marcel Duchamp selected a snow shovel, hung it from the ceiling of his studio, and called it art.”3 On the other hand, if beauty is a question of personal preference, then none can counter the Duchamp’s claim to artistry. 2To take a specific example, consider Jackson Pollock’s “Shimmering Substance,” which one reviewer claims to possess “the character of a sun-dappled summer day” (moma.org/collection/works/78376). 3www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/marcel-duchamp-in-advance-of-the-broken-arm-august-1964- fourth-version-after-lost-original-of-november-1915. One is reminded of the final scene of Homer’s Odyssey, in which Odysseus must journey inland from Ithaca until he finds people who mistake an oar for a winnowing fan. In this instance, the tool might be considered in respect only of its form. The question then remains whether art possesses objective criteria despite its grounding in subjective feeling. Hegel clarifies the subjective muddle. He understands the beautiful as “Idea, in particular as Idea in a determinate form, i.e. as Ideal [derived from Concept].”4 Before materializing as Ideal in a beautiful object, Idea exists only in the mind; thus, it is subjective. But “subjectivity” need not imply arbitrariness.5 On the contrary, subjective Concept possesses specific and definable qualities. This fact is difficult to grasp, but Gadamer offers an illuminating example to show Hegel can pair subjectivity with knowable characteristics: I shall take a famous example: The Brothers Karamazov. I can see the stairs down which Smerdjakov tumbles. Dostoevsky gives us a certain description. As a result, I know exactly what this staircase looks like. I know where it starts, how it gets darker and then turns to the left. All this is clear to me in the most concrete way and yet I also know that no one else “sees” the staircase the way I do. Many have read this scene, but few would describe—and probably none would “see” it—the same way. Variations of length and detail notwithstanding, every description of this scene will concern a man who tumbles down stairs. The “Concept” derivable from this scene are thus bounded, specific qualities, from which there may be derived nearly infinite descriptions of the scene. The Concept is infinite in number but finite in kind. Gadamer’s example underscores Hegel’s argument that, while the Concept of the beautiful resides first in the mind, it cannot be arbitrary. Instead, The beautiful thing in its existence makes its own Concept appear as realized and displays in itself subjective unity and life. Thereby the object has bent its outward tendency back into itself, has suppressed dependence on something else, and, under our consideration, has exchanged its unfree finitude for free infinity. (Hegel 114) Beautiful objects realize and display the Concept “beauty.” This Concept’s “free infinity” acts as the bounded string of infinite numbers between the integers one and 4Hegel. Lectures. 114. 5Kant and Hegel agree on this point. two. The outer bounds remain fixed, but infinite numbers lie within—a finite Concept holds infinite forms of beauty. Hegel thus informs our earlier discussion. Whereas contemporary artists deem art infinite and unbounded, Hegel’s calls it infinite but bounded. While innumerable, art is finite. A thing’s presentation as art does not make it art; some other quality does, but this quality remains to be seen. Thus, the argument has advanced considerably, but only in a negative sense. We can now claim what art is not, namely, “anything at all” or “anything displayed as art” or “anything that pleases.” This fact alone cannot determine what art is—a definition is in order. Gadamer, Hegel, and Kant will all inform our definition. First, Gadamer sets the stage by likening art to philosophy; both aim to convey particulars “in respect of the one” (12). Experience verifies this claim. One standardly gazes at lovely portraiture not to attain an accurate depiction of a historical figure—indeed, time and distance from the original model often preclude this aim—but to see the faces, poses, gestures, etc. that serve as a metonym for humanity. 6 One visits Charles W. Peale’s George Washington at the Battle of Princeton, for instance, for its depiction of pride, heartbreak, and hope within a single face. Accurate history will have little bearing on patrons’ enjoyment of this photo, for the actual battle featured few of the events painted behind Washington as there depicted. 7 To the requirement that art convey universals through particulars, Kant adds that it must possess an agreeable quality that does not merely please but also gratifies, “for if it [a work of art] merely pleases him [a viewer or listener], he must not call it beautiful.”8 Pleasure cannot animate the individual and suspend him within the 6 Police sketches provide the most prominent exception. Oliver Cromwell’s desire to be painted, “warts and all” gives another ostensible exception, but those who would later view his lumpy likeness might wish Cromwell had a slightly looser attachment to authenticity. 7 For an explanation of the discrepancies between this painting and the Battle of Princeton, see artmuseum.princeton.edu/collections/objects/45237. 8Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Judgement,” tr. James C. Meredeth, Oxford Clarendon Press (1952), 45, 52. work. Gratification can. Unlike the merely pleasing, the gratifying unites the individual with the object he sees, recommending itself not only to his senses but also to his imagination. 9 Finally, Hegel requires, as noted above, that art be Idea in a determinate form.10 The Ideas that art manifests may be infinite in number but remain finite in form. Through a combination of these three philosophers, art’s definition becomes “that which conveys particulars in respect of the one, which gratifies the imagination, and which manifests Concept pure as material Ideal.” This admittedly protracted definition will help to determine whether modern art is art and, by extension, whether it culminates or destroys art. Modern art fails to meet our definition. Its class includes things which can convey nothing other than particulars (shovels, rocks, road signs, etc.); which hardly please, much less gratify; and which are themselves often so obviously aimed at a material end (i.e. shoveling snow) that they cannot be said to display Concepts. Thus, modern art can have little bearing on art qua art. A separate category from art, modern art can no more destroy or culminate art as Concept than “cheap watches” as Concept can destroy or culminate “time.” This fact will be shown further through a logical analysis of the purpose of definitions. Definitions bound their subjects. The smaller the boundary, the more precise the definition and, by the transitive property, the more precise its subject. One definition of the word “cup,” for instance, entails all small vessels fit for bearing liquid to one’s mouth, be they glass or plastic, stout or thin, handled or non-handled, etc. 11 A “tea cup” entails only certain members of the class “cup,” namely, the glass, stout, handled kind with a rimmed bottom to fit a paired saucer. All tea cups are cups; only some cups are 9See Kant 41. 10Hegel uses “beautiful” where I here use art. Based on our discussion above, I find the substitution reasonable. 11I thank Elise Eckardt for pointing out the need to note that only one definition of “cup” concerns the mentioned objects and that “cups” as such entail further qualities not here delineated. tea cups. Thus, if some catastrophe were to destroy or pervert all tea cups, only part of the class “cup” would be affected. “Cup” would survive through its other subclasses: mugs, chalices, steins, etc. Likewise, a new class of objects introduced bearing the name “(x type of) cup” must fulfill cup’s definition before being subsumed under the broader category “cup”; classes must be “cups” before they can be “(x type of) cups.” If a class fails to meet the definition of its purported category, then it is not a member of the category. So with art. Either “modern art” is art, or it is not. Supposing the former, one can assert confidently that modern art will be a subaltern of art: all modern art will be art; only some art will be modern art. The destruction of the class “art” will involve not the perversion of a part, but of the whole, so modern art cannot destroy art as a class, regardless of its perversity. If, on the other hand, modern art is not art, then it can have no bearing on the class “art” as Concept, for the two Concepts do not overlap. Some might object that independent classes of things can destroy one another, as when loud music “destroys” or “ruins” a good conversation. This objection’s difficulty lies in the fact that it does not concern Concepts. When one complains of such a “ruined” conversation, he means that the conversation has failed to be a meaningful medium for the exchange of information and sentiments—it has failed to meet a criterion of its Idea. The Concept “conversation” remains. In fact, the very objectivity and certainty of conversation’s Concept—not its subjectivity and fluidity—grounds the concerns of those who complain of “ruined conversation.” Were there no objective Concept of “conversation,” then none would have a leg to stand on who complained of “ruined conversation.” Thus, if modern art has formed its own class, separate from art proper, then it cannot destroy “art” as Concept. Whether a class can culminate its category is a more difficult question. To continue the example of the cup, one might suppose that tea cups were somehow deemed the consummate cup. In this case, no reductions or additions could make the tea cup more cuplike, and things would be proper cups only so far as they are tea cups. Formerly, the class “tea cup” had possessed all universal qualities of cups plus certain particular qualities of tea cups. Now, only tea cups are truly cups, so the category “cup” will be greatly reduced to exclude all qualities different from those of the new category “tea cups.” Coffee mugs, for instance, would no longer be cups, for their uniform circumference and ceramic material are not part of the consummate cup. Thus, the difficulty with the notion that a class can culminate its category lies in the fact that overspecification of categories precludes proper members of the category.12 Now to return to art. Were a class to culminate its category, the other former classes of the category would no longer share in the category. Thus, if modern art culminates “art” proper, then non-modern art would no longer be considered “art.” But forms of non-modern art persist as art—viz. as things which convey particulars in respect of the one, gratify the imagination, and manifest Concept pure as material Ideal— so modern art cannot be the culmination of art. What, then, is modern art’s relation to art? Modern art bastardizes art by claiming common parentage. If all art shares its origins with modern art, then art derives from subjective, unbounded preference, from the pleasing and the particular rather than the gratifying and the universal. By asserting its membership in the category of art, modern art claims that some art can derive from unbounded preference, and it thus perverts art’s definition. This perversion runs a high risk of appearing convincing to injudicious observers, which is perhaps modern art’s greatest danger. 12This fact led Plato to locate forms in the spiritual realm (Phaedo 96a5–97b7; see also Aristotle’s response in Metaphysics A, especially 3ff.). Modern art typifies contemporary claims that anything “within oneself” is worth expression. If it feels good, do it, or more precisely, paint it, play it, or build it. Hence, apparently arbitrary paint splotches, indistinguishable from messy painter’s smocks, receive praise. The slogan to do what feels good derives from a flawed notion that the beautiful is necessarily subjective and therefore infinite and unbounded, that it relies not on the art’s substance, but on the artist’s intention.13 But subjectivity does not imply arbitrariness. Modern art, while it can neither culminate nor destroy “art” as such, bastardizes art, running the risk of convincing some that art can be founded on unbounded subjectivity. 13The words beauty/beautiful, skill/skillful, value/valuable, worth/worthy, purpose/purposeful appear nowhere on the MOMA website (moma.org).” MOMA aims not to display beauty, but “to be inclusive . . . to shar[e] the most thought-provoking modern and contemporary art.”