Philosophy: Soul Medicine in Boethius

The dichotomy of the goods’ perpetual reward and the wickeds’ undying misery is a chief pillar of the argument in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy. Philosophy, by illustrating that the consummate goodness of God is revealed through His allowing punishment, attempts convey the absurdity of Boethius’ despair, thus medicating Boethius and returning to him to his faculty of reason. This effort takes the pair to the argument of evil, leading to a discourse in which Philosophy expertly demonstrates that the worst evil is to wallow in wickedness and that suffering and punishment conduce justice and virtue. In the third poem of book four, Philosophy alludes to Homer’s Odyssey in order to demonstrate that power over one’s body is no true power. Boethius uses poem three and the surrounding prose to argue that the wicked, acting in accordance with temporary pleasure, have full control over only their bodies and that the good, acting in accordance with reason, have full control over both their bodies and their most important faculty: their minds. The congruity of the texts mentioned serves to demonstrate the power of philosophy as a medicine for the soul.

Philosophy recalls Odysseus’ trouble-ridden crew in their encounter with Circe, bewitching queen of Aeaea. Of their mutation into swine, Philosophy says, “only the mind remained to mourn the monstrous change they had suffered” (IV. Poem 3). But their minds’ being their only remaining faculty, says Philosophy, in no way lessens the crews’ humanity, for Circe’s “impotent herbs” held power only “over the bodies of men, but could not change their hearts” (IV. Poem 3). The crew, in no way less virtuous than they previously were, retain their faculty of reason and thus remain human though now assuming the form of Circe’s porcine guards. True loss of human nature is that noted by Boethius in the beginning of the fourth prose. He says, “although vicious men keep the appearance of their human bodies, they are nevertheless changed into beasts as far as the character of their soul is concerned.” Circe’s potion brings the body to a lower form, but leaves the mind intact; unmeasured viciousness lowers the mind yet leaves the body intact. Boethius’ noting this fact in the prose directly following Philosophy’s teaching on the same subject–namely, of men becoming beasts–demonstrates that the medicine of Philosophy–and of philosophy–is working.

A rash observer would be prone to say that Odysseus’ crew, being no longer of human form, had no power to act virtuously. Thinking perhaps that Philosophy had drinken from the river Lethe, one such reader of Boethius would point out that, only one prose passage prior, Philosophy asserted that will and power are necessary for anything to be accomplished (IV Prose 2). Philosophy, expertly predicting her opponents’ arguments without having to consult the “Wounded Muses” (I Prose 1), addresses in the fourth prose the issue of power. She tells Boethius that “the power of evil men...does not exist,” for true is the power to attain happiness, the power to act virtuously, and it lies not in one’s ability physically act, but in one’s ability to act in accordance with reason in such ways as his physical being allows (IV Prose 4). Thus, Odysseus’ crew lost no power when they were changed into pigs. Even as pigs, they could keep themselves from despairing at their situation, pitying themselves, envying others, or expressing any other deviation from a state of calm that entails a perversion of reason (see Tusculan Disputations IV.VIII). While they were boars, their form in no way required them to be boorish. Further developing this idea, Philosophy notes of physically afflicted individuals such as Odysseus’ crew that “we have much more reason to pity those whose minds are afflicted with wickedness, a thing worse than any sickness” (IV Prose 4, italics added). This idea brings full circle the notion that one’s reason is more important than his body, echoing the Christian thought that “physical training is of some value, but godliness has value for all things” (1 Timothy 4:8).

The idea of the body’s transience and the mind’s lasting significance is established throughout the Consolation; however, the third prose of chapter four lays the foundation for the particular arguments expressed in poem and prose that follow. Philosophy tells Boethius, “[n]o matter how the wicked rave, the wise man never loses his prize; nor does it ever diminish,” for “virtue is the reward of virtuous men” (IV Prose 3). Philosophy allots no physical reward to the wise, but one of intangible yet paramount value: virtue. Thus, the virtuous can suffer no physical loss, including a loss of their bodies, that would entail a loss of virtue. This argument brings Philosophy to the point that “to give oneself to evil,” not to lose one’s Physical being, “is to lose one’s human nature” (IV Prose 3 italics added). In anticipation of Poem Three, Philosophy concludes Prose Three with a paragraph comparing types of unvirtuous men to types of animals, saying, “anyone who abandons virtue ceases to be a man...and instead becomes a beast,” a fact that Boethius concedes in the following prose, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of Philosophy in bettering his soul. Philosophy raises up Boethius from a valley of despair and makes level his thoughts hitherto dwelling on the precipitous mountain of Confusion, bringing Boethius to a plain level plain of reason and virtue (cf. Isaiah 26:7; 40:4).

Poem Three and the surrounding prose passages have a rich dialogue that furthers Philosophy’s theme of a just and omnipotent God and shows Boethius’ being freed from his illness of mind. Prose Three offers the idea that “anyone...transformed by vice cannot be counted a man,” Poem Three gives a literary allusion to demonstrate the same point, and Prose Four shows Boethius’ agreeing with it. Similarly, Prose Three asserts that the wicked are never free from punishment, setting up the idea that the wicked have no power in their chasing fleshly pleasure; Poem Three shows that power over the body is useless without a faculty of reason; and Prose Four shows Boethius agreeing that the wicked have no power. The three passages thus demonstrate Boethius’ recovery from a state of despair. His illness being one of the soul, it is only proper that philosophy be used to medicate Boethius. Boethius’ eyes are made clear as are Elijah’s servant (2 Kings 7), and the army that surrounds him is one of virtue, reason, philosophy, and newfound realization of God’s omnipotence and consummate goodness.

Photo Credit: Circe and Odysseus, by Matthijs Naiveu.