Stoic Emotions: Literary Examples
Cicero gives a Stoic argument against emotions in his Tusculan Disputations. In medias res, he defines some such emotions as should be avoided. Among the twenty-two listed reprehensible reactions are the negative emotions of mourning and jealousy and the positive emotion of compassion. These three emotions are seen in the actions of Achilles, Jacob (brother of Esau), and Mary Magdalene, respectively, and each emotion serves to develop the person’s character in the story.
Achilles mourns the death of Patroclus, tearing out his hair and “loos[ing] a terrible, wrenching cry” that caused his mother to hear him from the “salt green depths” of the sea (Iliad 18.30–40). Cicero would say that such behavior is “utter folly” with “no possible advantage” (III.XXXII). He even tells of Agamemnon and Accius’s acting similarly, “imagining that [their] grief would be alleviated by baldness” (III.XXVI). Though Cicero satirizes the mourning, Achilles certainly mourns by Cicero’s definition, for he feels “distress arising from the untimely death of a beloved object” (IV.VIII). (The question then arises whether one can mourn even if the death of said object is not “untimely,” or if any death can truly be untimely. For as humans are mortal, their death is a part of their natural life cycle and is entirely expected to occur at one time or another.) Achilles’ circumstance, then, is as much an example of mourning as any other, regardless of the fact that Achilles’ earlier prayer to Zeus presupposes Patroclus’ death, for Patroclus’ death comes at an inopportune time from Achilles’ standpoint (Iliad 1.480–490). As Achilles shows the emotion of mourning, so Jacob shows the emotion of jealousy toward his brother, Esau.
Jacob is in his brother’s shadow from birth; the two are twins, and Jacob is born holding onto Esau’s heel. In fact, Jacob’s name actually means “he takes by the heel” and “he deceives” (ESV). The culmination of Jacob’s jealousy comes when he pretends to be his brother Esau to steal Esau’s final blessing from their father, Isaac. Living up to his name, Jacob deceives his father four times in order to receive his brother’s blessing, yet he is found out, and Isaac decides to bless both children anyway (Genesis 27:18–46). In accordance with Cicero’s definition of jealousy, Jacob feels “distress arising from the fact that the thing [he] has coveted [him]self is in the possession of another man as well as [his] own,” for Jacob had his father’s blessing yet had distress that his brother did as well (IV.VIII). Jacob’s story can aid Cicero’s argument that emotions are not beneficial because it shows that an emotion can lead to deceiving and trickery. The story of Mary Magdalene, however, might aid the opposition of Cicero’s argument.
Mary Magdalene weeps when Jesus’ tomb is found empty and the stone rolled back. She feels “distress arising from the wretchedness of a neighbor in undeserved suffering” (IV.VIII). Mary Magdalene exemplifies such compassion, for Jesus deserved no suffering whatsoever. In other circumstances, take, for instance, a person wrongfully convicted of a certain crime, the person who receives punishment is innocent of the one injury, but guilty of another or others). And, as Cicero states, “no one is moved by compassion for the punishment of a murderer or a traitor” (IV.VIII). (Of course, it is assumed that Cicero is referring to the just punishment of a murderer or a traitor; that is to say, the punishment of one such for being a murderer or a traitor or for some being or doing some other thing or things which the accused has indeed been or done.) Thus, Mary Magdalene’s crying is a perfect example of compassion as it is a faultless individual for whom she cries.
Even a staunch anti-stoic could see that jealousy led to further distress for Jacob in the short term, and jealousy is generally not fruitful in any case. One might note that the jealousy ended in a valuable lesson: to be content with what one has. However, the lesson would not have been necessary were it not for the jealousy. The other examples show a bit of hope for the anti-stoic, however. Cicero might argue that Mary Magdalene’s tears will not bring Jesus back to life, that they will not right the wrong of the alleged crime of grave robbery, that Achilles’ tears and hair-pulling will not bring Patroclus back to life, and these arguments are correct; however, there appears something consummately human and natural about Achilles’ mourning and Mary Magdalen’s compassion. Achilles expresses his love for Patroclus through his mourning just as Mary Magdalene expresses her love for her Savior through her compassion. It is a curious notion indeed that love–defined by conscious choice–can be expressed through emotion if indeed emotion shows such a lack of self-control as Cicero states. In fact, all of the things that love is made up of–patience, giving of self, kindness–necessarily involve conscious decision and thus self-control. This fact, that the elements of love necessitate self-control, would imply that the means of expressing such elements require self-control, for one cannot enact self-control out of a lack thereof just as one cannot make an intelligent conversation out of a want for words. Are then, then, the emotions of Achilles and Mary Magdalene to be said not to be enacted out of love? Or, perhaps, are emotions not necessary to express love, implying that love can be entirely void of emotion? It appears arguing emotions to be, in their every facet, thoroughly unnecessary is difficult if not entirely fallacious. In any case, the above examples of emotions fit Cicero’s definition, though perhaps not his logic.
Works Cited
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Tusculan disputations. Chicago, Ill.: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1985. Print.
ESV: study Bible : English standard version.. ESV text ed. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Bibles, 2007.
Fagles, Robert. The Iliad. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Viking, 1990. Print.